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Summary
Chemical facilities might be vulnerable to direct attacks by terrorists or covert
use of business contacts, facilities, and materials to gain access to potentially
dangerous chemicals.  Because few terrorist attacks have been attempted on U.S.
chemical facilities, the estimated risk of death and injury in the near future is low,
relative to the likelihood of accidents or attacks on other targets using conventional
weapons.  For any individual chemical plant, the risk is very small, but risks may be
increasing, consequences for human health and the environment could be severe, and
available evidence indicates that many facilities may lack adequate safeguards.  
The federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act and Clean
Air Act require planning to protect the general public from accidental releases of
hazardous chemicals from chemical facilities.  The Acts mandate disclosure of
chemical hazards in order to stimulate public interest in planning. Since neither law
addresses releases due to terrorism, EPA authority to regulate in this area is unclear.
Congress might rely on existing mechanisms in the public and private sectors
to evaluate and improve chemical site security, while waiting for better information
about the potential harm from terrorist attacks on chemical facilities.  Oversight of
EPA implementation of existing planning requirements also is an option.  Or,
Congress might enact legislation to reduce risks in several ways.  The most common
approach is to “harden” defenses, for example by increasing security patrols.
Hardening tactics may be adapted to security needs, layered to deepen protection, and
often are relatively low cost.  A potential disadvantage is that even the most effective
security measures might be defeated by a determined, skilled terrorist organization.
Risk also might be reduced by use of safer chemicals, procedures, and processes.
This strategy might reduce harm from accidents as well as attacks, but may involve
higher costs. Restricting terrorists’ access to information might be the least costly
option, but would limit public access and reduce accountability of facility owners.
Policy makers face at least three key issues: the effect of public disclosure; the
relative importance of diverse risks; and who should be responsible for achieving
results.  Various legislative proposals in the 107th Congress (S. 1456, S. 1602/H.R.
5300, S. 2452, S. 2579, H.R. 2435, and H.R. 4698) would have required owners to
reduce the hazards at chemical facilities and  restricted access to hazardous chemicals
or to information about chemical facilities.  Public Law 107-296, establishing the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), does not address chemical plant security
directly.  However, if facilities are part of the “critical infrastructure” (e.g., water
utilities), the law requires DHS to analyze vulnerabilities and recommend ways to
enhance site security.  Information voluntarily submitted to DHS about facility
vulnerability is exempt from public disclosure requirements of the Freedom of
Information Act and state or local laws.  In the 108th Congress, S. 6 and S. 157 would
direct EPA to oversee chemical facilities, in consultation with DHS.  They would
require high priority facilities to identify hazards, assess vulnerabilities, and develop
and implement plans to reduce the consequences of terrorist attacks.  
This report will be updated as warranted by congressional activity.
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Book, especially the section entitled Prevention: Security Enhancements.
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3 Instead, see the CRS Terrorism Briefing Book, the Domestic Emergency Management
section, especially the pages “Emergency Preparedness,” “FEMA Role and Responsibility,”
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Terrorists, Federal Activities, and Options to Reduce Risks.
Chemical Plant Security
Introduction
The potential harm to public health and the environment from a sudden release
of hazardous chemicals has long concerned the U.S. Congress.  The sudden,
accidental release in December 1984 of methyl isocyanate in an industrial accident
at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, and the attendant loss of thousands of
lives and widespread injuries spurred legislative proposals to reduce the risk of
chemical accidents in the United States.  For example, federal environmental laws
were enacted in 1986 and 1990 to mitigate and reduce the risk of accidental releases
of hazardous chemicals from manufacturing facilities, processing plants, and storage
tanks.  (These laws are discussed below.)  The Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act of 1975 was passed to protect the public and environment in the event of an
accident during transportation of chemicals.  Other federal laws coordinate
preparedness planning and response to significant chemical spills (e.g., the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act).  In the
aftermath of September 11, 2001, however, Congress is re-examining existing federal
laws, including laws related to hazardous chemicals in U.S. commerce, to determine
whether they are adequate to prevent, deter, or mitigate  the effects of terrorist acts.1
This report reviews requirements that aim to reduce risks to the general public
of exposure to hazardous chemicals as a result of terrorist acts at U.S. chemical
production, processing, or storage facilities.2  It considers the likelihood and severity
of harm that might result from terrorist attacks on chemical facilities, as well as from
illicit use of such facilities to gain access to hazardous chemicals (or to precursor
chemicals that can be used to produce hazardous chemicals).  Federal requirements
for contingency planning and responding to chemical emergencies after they occur
are not the focus of this report.3  In addition, it does not consider  hazardous materials
transport (or storage incidental to transport).4   
CRS-2
5 Freeh, Louis J.,  Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Statement for the Record on
the Threat of Terrorism to the United States before the United States Senate Committees on
Appropriations, Armed Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence.  May 10, 2001.  
[http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/freeh051001.htm] 
6 The Oklahoma City bombing of the federal building in 1995 accounts for 168 of the 182
deaths during the decade.  
7 Counterterrorism Division, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice. Terrorism in the United States
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The report first describes the range of terrorist acts that might threaten chemical
facilities and summarizes publicly available information relevant to risks:  recent
trends in terrorist activity, including chemical use by terrorists; expert estimates of
the harm that might be inflicted through chemical terrorism; and assessments of the
vulnerability of chemical facilities.  The next section of the report provides
background information on existing federal mandates and incentives for reducing
risks of accidental releases from chemical facilities.  The remainder of the report
summarizes recent administrative and private sector initiatives to improve chemical
site security; analyzes policy options and key issues; and describes legislation in the
108th Congress.
Risks of Terrorism at Chemical Facilities
 
Nature of Hazards.  Potential terrorist acts against chemical facilities might
be classified roughly into two categories:  direct attacks on facilities or chemicals on
site, or covert use of  business contacts, facilities, and materials (e.g., letterhead,
telephones, computers, etc.) to gain access to materials.  In either case, terrorists may
be employees (saboteurs) or outsiders, acting alone or in collaboration with others.
In the case of a direct attack, traditional or nontraditional weapons may be employed,
including explosives, incendiary devices, firearms, airplanes, computer programs, or
weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological).
In obtaining chemicals, a terrorist’s intent may be their use as weapons or to
make weapons, including but not limited to explosives, incendiaries, poisons, and
caustics.  Access to chemicals might be gained by physically entering a facility and
stealing supplies, or by using legitimate or fraudulent credentials (e.g., company
stationary, order forms, computers, telephones or other resources) to order, receive,
or distribute chemicals.  
Recent Trends in Overall Terrorist Activities.  According to May 2001
testimony by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the U.S.
Senate, the total number of known or suspected acts of terrorism perpetrated in the
United States increased from 2 in 1995 to 12 in 1999.5  (Later incidents were still
being investigated.)  In addition, Director Freeh reported that there were 7 planned
acts of terrorism in the United States that were prevented in 1999. Only a few of
these incidents involved chemical facilities.  Overall, throughout the 1990s there
were 60 attacks characterized as terrorism claiming 182 lives and injuring over 1,932
individuals.6  In comparison, during the 1980s, there were 267 terrorist or suspected
terrorist incidents, which killed 23 people and injured 105.7  Thus, although the total
CRS-3
7 (...continued)
1999: 30 Years of Terrorism, A Special Retrospective Edition,   p. 16.
8 U.S. Department of State.  2001  Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000.  Appendix C.
[http://www.state.gov/cms_images/378699.gif]
9 Ibid.
10 The anthrax killings may or may not be found to meet the FBI definition of terror,
depending on whether the criminal intended to further political or social objectives.
11 Watson, Dale L., Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Statement for the Record on the terrorist threat confronting
the United States before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  Feb. 6, 2002. 
[http:///www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/watson020602.htm] 
12 Ibid, p. 1.
13 Ibid.
14 Counterterrorism Division, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit,
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number of terrorist acts in the United States has declined in recent years, the
casualties due to terrorism have increased.  
The same trends are evident internationally, although there is considerable
variation from year to year.8  Attacks against Americans abroad most often have
targeted U.S. businesses: for example, in 2000, 178 of the 206 overseas U.S. targets
struck by international terrorists were businesses.9  
Data for 2001 are still being gathered as investigations of criminal acts continue.
The Pentagon and World Trade Center attacks and the attack thwarted by airline
passengers on September 11, 2001, however, clearly make 2001 the most costly year
on record in terms of U.S. terrorism casualties.10  As noted by the FBI Executive
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, the attack of
September 11, 2001, “marked a dramatic escalation in a trend toward more
destructive terrorist attacks which began in the 1980s.”11  
The September 11 attack also reflected a trend toward more indiscriminate
targeting among international terrorists.  The vast majority of the more
than 3,000 victims of the attack were civilians.  In addition, the attack
represented the first known case of suicide attacks carried out by
international terrorists in the United States.  The September 11 attack also
marked the first successful act of international terrorism in the United
States since the vehicle bombing of the World Trade Center in February
1993.12
Other potentially important trends identified by intelligence agencies include:
! an increase in activity by loosely affiliated extremists, both
domestically and internationally; and 




Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice. Terrorism in the United States
1999: 30 Years of Terrorism, A Special Retrospective Edition,   p. 25.
15 Ibid., pp. 17, 25. 
16 Department of Justice.  Assessment of the Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal
Activity Associated with Posting Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information on the Internet.
April 18, 2000.  p. 23-24.
17 Parachini, John V. “The World Trade Center Bombers (1993).”  In:  Jonathan B. Tucker
(ed.) 2000. Toxic Terror: assessing terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  p. 190. Citing the summation statement of Henry J. DePippo,
Prosecutor, United States of America v. Mohammad A. Salameh et al., S593CR.180 (KTD),
Feb, 16, 1994, p. 8435-8439.
18 Ibid.
19 Bond, Christopher.  Statement on S. 2579.  Congressional Record, Daily Edition, June 5,
2002,  p. S5043. 
Trends in Chemical Terrorism. With respect to chemical and biological
terrorism, hoaxes and unsuccessful attempts by terrorists to use chemicals increased
throughout the 1990s.  Loosely affiliated terrorist groups, in particular, have
demonstrated a growing interest in chemical weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction, but explosives are still the most frequently employed weapons.15  
During the 1990s, both international and domestic terrorists attempted to use
explosives to release chemicals from manufacturing and storage facilities.   Most of
these attempts were abroad in war zones such as Croatia, including attacks on a plant
producing fertilizer, carbon black, and light fraction petroleum products; other plants
producing pesticides; and a pharmaceutical factory using ammonia, chlorine, and
other hazardous chemicals.  All of these facilities were close to population centers.
In the United States, there were at least two instances during the late 1990s when
criminals attempted to cause releases of chemicals from facilities.  One involved a
large propane storage facility, and the other a gas refinery.16 
Evidence that U.S. chemical facilities may be used by terrorists to gain access
to chemicals also exists.  For example, one of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers,
Nidal Ayyad, became a naturalized U.S. citizen, graduated from Rutgers University,
and worked as a chemical engineer at Allied Signal, from which he used company
stationery to order chemical ingredients to make the bomb.  According to a U.S.
Prosecutor in the case against the bombers, though “some suppliers balked when the
order came from outside official channels, when the delivery address was a storage
park, or when [a co-conspirator] tried to pay for the chemicals in cash,” others did
not.17  Moreover, testimony at the trial of the bombers indicated that they had
successfully stolen cyanide from a chemical facility and were training to introduce
it into the ventilation systems of office buildings.18  More recently, chemical trade
publications reportedly were found in al Qaeda hideaways.19
Predicted Risks of Chemical Terrorism.  The validity of any risk
assessment depends on how much is known about the hazard, risks (probabilities),
CRS-5
20 Computerized databases on terrorist acts offer considerable promise for risk analysts who
have access.  Nevertheless, the unpredictable nature of individuals and of the social and
political forces that shape them over time will continue to challenge predictions about future
events.  
21 Purver, Ron.  Chemical and biological terrorism: The threat according to the open
literature,.  June 1995.  Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 
[http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/tabintr_e.html], visited Sept. 28, 2001.
22 Ibid, Chemical Terrorism, p. 28.  This prediction about the use of chemical agents
contrasts with conventional wisdom that the probability of chemical weapon use is relatively
small.  The conventional prediction, however, focuses on military use of chemical weapons
in future wars among nations, rather than on chemical use by terrorists.  
23 Ibid., p. 29.
adverse effects, events and conditions that lead to or modify adverse effects or risks,
and populations or environments that influence or experience adverse effects.  The
most accurate, and therefore the most useful, risk assessments generally are for
familiar, frequently occurring hazards and events with impacts that vary with some
regularity – e.g., for severe storms or floods.  In contrast, the risk of terrorist activity
is unfamiliar (at least in the United States), rarely experienced, and likely to vary
significantly over time, depending on rather unpredictable social and political
phenomena. 
The risk of terrorism targeting chemical facilities is particularly difficult to
assess for at least three reasons:  
! There are few prior examples of terrorists targeting chemical
facilities;
! Numerous factors theoretically may increase or decrease risks; and
! Interactions among factors influencing risks are dynamic and
changing. 
In part, these difficulties stem from the nature of terrorism and the terrorists’
deliberate efforts to do what is least expected – i.e., to defy prediction.  For these
reasons, most experts have not tried to quantify risks; existing analyses of chemical
terrorism risks in the open literature are speculative and qualitative.20  
Until the mid to late 1990s, reports focused on the acquisition and use of
chemical weapons, such as sarin or mustard gas.  One of the most comprehensive of
these reports was a 1995 review of the open literature on terrorism that was prepared
for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.21  According to this review of the
literature, “[t]hose authors who have speculated about the future terrorist use of
chemical agents in particular have generally rated its likelihood as quite high.”22  
According to some, the risk also appears to be increasing.  Many experts today
believe that factors that might have inhibited proliferation and use of chemicals as
weapons in the past are eroding.  For example, some experts hypothesized several
years ago that the combination of chemical and strategic skills necessary to create and
deploy chemical weapons would prevent the lone terrorist from using them.23
Security experts now believe that lack of personal expertise no longer limits chemical
CRS-6
24 For example, according to a June 7, 2002, New York Times opinion piece, “All-American
Osamas,” by Nicholas D. Kristof, one militia member who led a chemical attack against an
Internal Revenue Service office had a degree in chemistry from Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.  Authorities reportedly believe that he made sarin in his basement.   The author
indicated his source for this information was Jessica Stern, a Harvard University lecturer on
terrorism and author of The Ultimate Terrorists, published in 1999 by Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA.
25 Purver, p. 5-13.
26 U.S. Congress.  General Accounting Office.  Combating Terrorism: Need for
Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks.
GAO/NSIAD-99-163.  Sept. 1999.  p. 1.
27 Ibid., p. 3.
weapon use, because there is a tendency for terrorists with similar extreme views to
affiliate loosely with others with complementary skills and abilities.  Moreover, the
rising level of education worldwide means that more people have the requisite
training in chemical engineering,24 and the Internet has simplified communications,
training, and cooperation within geographically dispersed terrorist groups. 
Others have argued that chemical attacks would be unlikely, due to the
difficulties of producing and effectively delivering chemical agents in sufficient
amounts to produce mass casualties.25  However, while this may be true with regard
to military use on a large scale, where weapons are delivered by advanced systems,
it is not necessarily relevant to terrorists who may have more limited ambitions.  A
1999 report by GAO summarized the situation – 
... many conflicting statements have been made in public testimony before
Congress ... concerning the ease or difficulty with which terrorists could
effectively disseminate a chemical or biological agent on U.S. soil and cause
mass casualties.26
GAO studied the threat and concluded that the ease or difficulty for terrorists to cause
more than 1,000 casualties depends on the chemical or biological agent selected.  The
report stated – 
Experts from the scientific, intelligence, and law enforcement communities told
us that terrorists do not need sophisticated knowledge or dissemination methods
to use toxic industrial chemicals such as chlorine.  In contrast, terrorists would
need a relatively high degree of sophistication to successfully cause mass
casualties with some other chemical and most biological agents.  
On the other hand, 
“[t]errorists with less sophistication could make a chemical or biological weapon
and disseminate agents, but these would be less likely to cause mass
casualties.”27 
Other factors that might have inhibited chemical use by some terrorists in the
past might not apply to loosely affiliated terrorist groups.  For example, some experts
argue that terrorists supported by nation-states have been reluctant to use chemical
CRS-7
28 Purver, p. 28.
29 U.S. Congress.  House. Committee on Government Reform.  Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans’ Affairs, and International Relations.  Combating Terrorism: Assessing
the Threat.  Hearings, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 20, 1999.  Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 2000, p. 55-56.
30 The most comprehensive, but still incomplete, listing of chemical spills and releases is
kept by the National Response Center and available on the Internet at 
[http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/foia.htm] 
weapons for fear of offending other nations and neutral parties, particularly if the
sponsors were signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention.28  Another possible
deterrent to chemical use, fear of retaliation, probably is of little concern to attackers
with no identifiable homeland or headquarters.  Lack of a homeland might also lessen
concern about environmental damage that may be associated with chemical
production.  Finally, one must presume that occupational safety would be of limited
concern to terrorists who are not accountable to a government, and who are willing
to sacrifice their own lives for a religious, political, or social cause.  
However, many experts believe that the relative risk of terrorism involving
chemical weapons remains small.  This point was stressed by John V. Parachini, a
senior associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies at a 1999 hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations.  Referring to the risk of any use of chemical or
biological weapons he stated:
. . . attacks with chemical and biological weapons are strikingly infrequent and
the number of fatalities and casualties are far lower than those caused by
conventional explosives.  According to an analysis of 105 U.S. incidents featured
in the Monterey Institute database from 1900 to 1998, only one fatality resulted
from a [chemical or biological weapon] attack.  This incident involved a 1973
assassination of an Oakland, California school superintendent by the Symbionese
Liberation Army.29  
Severity of Harm.  It is generally agreed that chemical agents are likely to be
the least lethal of the three “weapons of mass destruction.”  In part, this judgment
reflects the difficulty of producing and delivering large quantities of a lethal chemical
to the target area prior to release.  On the other hand, industrial chemicals and
pesticides are readily available for purchase, and are stored in large quantities in
thousands of locations throughout the United States, often near population centers.
A key question for chemical facilities then is “How much damage could terrorists do
using existing stationary chemical manufacturing, processing, distribution, and
storage facilities?”  
There are two key sources of information for answering this question: accident
reports and hazard assessments conducted by facility personnel or outside experts.
There is no comprehensive database for either kind of information,30 but various
groups have used publicly available data to estimate hazard potential, usually limited
to accidental releases of chemicals from chemical facilities. 
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31 Laplante, Allison. 1998.  Too Close To Home: A Report on Chemical Accident Risks in
the United States.  U.S. Public Interest Research Group.  
[http://uspirg.org/uspirg.asp?id2=5067&id3=USPIRG&]   
32 “Vulnerable zones” apply to facilities required to prepare risk management plans under
the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r).  By definition, people within the zone could (but would
not necessarily) sustain serious injuries from short-term exposures.  
33 Laplante, Executive Summary.  p. 2.
34 Belke, James C.  Chemical accident risks in U.S. industry – A preliminary analysis of
accident risk data from U.S. hazardous chemical facilities.  Sept. 25, 2000.  p. 24.
[http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/pubs/stockholmpaper.pdf]
35 Belke, p. 26.
A 1998 report by the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (US PIRG) and the
National Environmental Law Center, Too Close to Home: Chemical Accident Risks
in the  United States, addressed the distribution of chemical facilities in the United
States relative to population distribution.  It stated that “more than 41 million
Americans live within range of a toxic cloud that could result from a chemical
accident at a facility located in their home zip code.”31  Those 41 million Americans
live in zip codes that contain manufacturing companies with “vulnerable zones”
extending more than three miles from the facility, the report states.  A “vulnerable
zone” is the geographic area that could be affected by the worst possible accident at
a facility.32  According to the report, the estimate of 41 million Americans at risk may
underestimate the hazard, because it was based on “assumptions about facility and
atmospheric conditions that would lead to small vulnerability zones.”33  To produce
the estimate, the study author stated that he used standard methodology used by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and data on chemical storage from
EPA’s 1995 Toxics Release Inventory, a database of routine releases of industrial
chemicals from manufacturing facilities.  
Hazard estimates by James C. Belke, an EPA employee in the Chemical
Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office, are more detailed.  Based on a
preliminary analysis of approximately 15,000 facility risk management plans for
chemical facilities that were filed under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r) before
September 25, 2000,34  Belke concluded that the median distance from a facility to
the outer edge of its vulnerable zone is 1.6 miles in the case of toxic worst case
scenarios, and 0.4 miles for flammable worst case scenarios.  However, many
facilities reported vulnerable zones potentially extending 14 miles from the facility
(primarily for releases in urban areas of chlorine stored in 90-ton rail tank cars) and
25 miles (for releases in rural terrain of chlorine stored in 90-ton rail tank cars).
Other chemicals for which reported vulnerable zones equaled or exceeded 25 miles
include anhydrous ammonia, hydrogen fluoride, sulfur dioxide, chlorine dioxide,
oleum (fuming sulfuric acid), sulfur trioxide, hydrogen chloride, hydrocyanic acid,
phosgene, propionitrile, bromine, and acrylonitrile.)  
Belke found the median population “affected” in a worst case accident was 15
people, for a flammable substance, while the median for toxic substances was 1,500
people.35  (“Affected” means potentially exposed.  It is highly unlikely that all people
within the vulnerable zone would be exposed due to a single release.  However,
CRS-9
36 Belke, J. (2001), "Chemical Accident Risks in U.S. Industry - A preliminary analysis of
accident risk data from U.S. hazardous chemical facilities", Proceedings of the 10th
International Symposium on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process
Industries,  Stockholm,  Sweden,  Pasman,  Fredholm, and  Jacobson (eds.),  Elsevier
Science B.V.  –  Note:  This does not mean that more than a million people would be
exposed and injured, but rather that, depending on wind direction and other factors, some
portion of the population in the zone might be exposed  and injured. 
37 Ibid.
38 Department of Justice, p. 13.
39 Ibid.
40 Kleindorfer, Paul R., Harold Feldman, and Robert A. Lowe.  Accident Epidemiology and
the U.S. Chemical Industry: Preliminary Results from RMP*Info.  Working Paper 00-01-15.
Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania.  Revised March 6, 2000.  27 p. 
[http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/epi_downloads.html] 
41 Ibid. p. 9.
anyone within the zone could be in the path of the chemical released, given certain
environmental conditions.)  Further EPA analysis of risk management plans
submitted by facilities handling chemicals covered by the CAA Section 112 revealed
that at least 123 plants reported a worst-case scenario with a vulnerability zone
containing more than a million people.36  The analysis also found that more than 700
plants could threaten 100,000 people, and at least 3,000 facilities could threaten
10,000 people in the vicinity.37
The Department of Justice (DOJ) analyzed EPA data and concluded that among
facilities submitting risk management plans to EPA, more than 7,000 facilities
projected worst case scenarios for toxic substances that could potentially affect more
than 1,000 people.38  Almost 1,700 facilities reported the possibility that a less
extreme accident might potentially affect more than 1,000 people.39 
Histories of actual accidents (as opposed to hypothetical worst-case scenarios)
for facilities submitting risk management plans to EPA prior to October 21, 1999,
were summarized in a working paper prepared by the Center for Risk Management
and Decision Processes at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.40  Of
14,500 reporting facilities, 1,145 reported 1,913 accidents between June 21, 1994 and
June 20, 1999.  Of the 1,145 facilities reporting accidents, 346 facilities had multiple
accidents.  Half of the chemicals for which risk management planning is required
under the CAA Section 112(r) were involved in accidents.  Half of the accidents
resulted in reported injuries to workers.  Accidents caused a reported 1,897 injuries
and 33 deaths to employees, 141 injuries and no deaths to non-employees.  No deaths
were reported off-site.  However, over 200,000 community residents were involved
in evacuations and shelter-in-place incidents.41 
Further analysis by the Wharton group revealed that the risk of accidental
chemical releases and of worker injuries or property damage increased with the size
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of the facility (from 10 to 1,000 full-time equivalent employees or FTEs).42  Note that
this refers to accidents of any kind, not to worst-case events.)  In addition, facilities
reporting that they handled large amounts and many types of chemicals had much
higher accident rates than facilities handling smaller amounts and fewer types of
chemicals.  The probability that a facility had experienced a chemical accident of any
size approached 100% for the very largest chemical manufacturers.  Toxic chemicals
were more strongly associated with worker injuries, while flammable chemicals were
more strongly associated with property damage.  No regional trends in accident rates
were discovered – i.e., facilities in various geographical regions had similar accident
rates. 
In contrast to the above figures, which all were based on hypothetical or actual
accidents described in risk management plans, the Washington Post reported March
12, 2002, that a classified study conducted by the U.S. Army Surgeon General dated
October 29, 2001, found that a terrorist attack resulting in a chemical release in a
densely populated area could injure or kill as many as 2.4 million people.43
According to the news article, the study found “even middle-range casualty estimates
from a chemical weapons attack or explosion of a toxic chemical manufacturing plant
are as high as 903,400 people.”44  The worst-case estimate of 2.4 million casualties
from a chemical release was roughly half the surgeon general’s estimate for
casualties due to widespread use of biological weapons, according to the report.  The
Army Surgeon General recently explained that the estimate of 2.4 million casualties
is of “the number of people who might request medical treatment during a total
release of a large industrial chemical manufacturing plant, in a densely populated
area, and under ideal weather conditions for maximum exposure.”45  As in most
studies of this kind, some question the magnitude and likelihood of the casualty
estimates.  
 Chemical Site Vulnerability.  CRS identified two publicly available reports
that assess site security at U.S. chemical plants.  In addition, a recently published
investigative report by a newspaper documents many unsupervised visits by reporters
to facilities subject to risk management planning provisions under the Clean Air Act.
The studies and newspaper accounts are summarized below. 
Prior to September 11, an assessment of chemical plant site security by the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) was considered by
many to be the most comprehensive analysis that was publicly available.  ATSDR
researchers reviewed national statistics on domestic terrorism compiled by the FBI
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in 1995, and interviewed security staff from facilities and potential targets in one
community with numerous chemical plants.46  ATSDR researchers concluded – 
! “security at chemical plants ranged from fair to very poor;”47  
! chemical plant security managers “were very pessimistic about their
ability to deter sabotage by employees, yet none of them had
implemented simple background checks for key employees such as
chemical process operators;” and 
! “none of the corporate security staff had been trained to identify
combinations of common chemicals at their facilities that could be
used as improvised explosives and incendiaries.”48  
The full ATSDR report was never made public, but a DOJ report noted that – 
among the ‘soft targets’ that the ATSDR identified as potential terrorist sites
were chemical manufacturing plants (chlorine, peroxides, other industrial gases,
plastics, and pesticides); compressed gases in tanks, pipelines, and pumping
stations; and pesticide manufacturing and supply distributors.49
The DOJ released a study April 18, 2000, describing the risk of terrorism aimed
at chemical plants.50  It concluded that “the risk of terrorists attempting in the
foreseeable future to cause an industrial chemical release is both real and credible.”51
The study also noted that security at many industrial facilities generally is “not as
substantial as the security at other comparable potential terrorist targets.”52
In April and May, 2002, six to seven months after September 11, 2001, the
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review published a series of articles describing an investigation
of plant security conducted by the paper’s reporters.  On April 7, 2002, the newspaper
stated that “anyone has unfettered access to more than two dozen potentially
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dangerous plants in the region” (referring to western Pennsylvania).53  The author of
the report continued:
The security was so lax at 30 sites that in broad daylight a Trib reporter –
wearing a press pass and carrying a camera – could walk or drive right up to
tanks, pipes and control rooms considered key targets for terrorists. 
The report was based on reporters’ trips to 30 plants in western Pennsylvania which
have filed risk management plans under the Clean Air Act, Section 112.  Two of the
plants are among the 123 plants nationwide that have projected potential risks to
more than 1,000,000 residents in the event of a worst-case accident or attack.  The
30 companies constituted more than half of the 61 sites in the region required to file
risk management plans.  Fifteen of the sites to which reporters gained unchallenged
access were water treatment facilities in Pennsylvania and Maryland.
In May, another Tribune-Review article described a similar investigation of 30
additional plants in Houston, Baltimore, and Chicago.54  The report concluded that
security was lax at some of “the potentially deadliest plants” in all three cities; access
was easy to some sites owned by corporations with large security budgets;
employees, customers, neighbors, and contractors “not only let a stranger walk
through warehouses, factories, tank houses and rail depots, but also gave directions
to the most sensitive valves and control rooms;” and access to 19 sites was allowed
due to “unguarded rail lines and drainage ditches, dilapidated or nonexistent fences,
open doors, poorly angled cameras and unmanned train gates.” 
Chemical manufacturers and users contacted by reporters said that they had
bolstered security recently.  Several site managers reported that they made immediate
changes in procedures or construction plans in response to security breaches by the
reporters.  But security cannot be ensured “overnight,”according to the president of
the Pennsylvania Chemical Industry Council,55 and it can be expensive.  For example,
the newspaper reported that U.S. Steel spends more than $1 million each year to
equip, train, and hire its own hazardous chemicals response team, firefighters,
paramedics, and gate guards at its coke factory.56
Conclusion.  Whether recent trends in domestic and international terrorism
will continue into the future, and whether they will be reflected in risks to U.S.
chemical facilities, is unknown.  Historically, there have been very few terrorist
attacks on chemical facilities in the United States.  Therefore, the estimated risk of
death and injury from such attacks in the immediate future is low relative to the
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likelihood of other hazardous events, such as industrial accidents or terrorist attacks
on other targets using conventional weapons.  For any individual chemical plant, the
risk of attack is extremely small.  However, the overall risks to chemical facilities
may be increasing.
In contrast to the low probability of chemical terrorism, possible consequences
for human health and the environment from such an event could be severe.
Moreover, limited evidence suggests that chemical facilities may be “soft targets,”
lacking in adequate safeguards against criminal and terrorist attacks.  
Existing Federal Requirements to Reduce Risks at Chemical
Facilities
Two key federal laws require or encourage certain chemical facility operators
to reduce risks to the general public associated with releases of hazardous chemicals:
the Emergency Response and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and the
Clean Air Act (CAA).  Both focus on accidental releases of hazardous chemicals. 
EPCRA.  In 1986, two years after the Bhopal accident, Congress enacted
EPCRA (codified at 42 U.S.C. 11001-11050) as Title III of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (P.L. 99-499).57 EPCRA mandated the
establishment of State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) and Local
Emergency Response Committees (LEPCs) to coordinate planning and response to
potentially large releases of specified “extremely hazardous substances.”58  The Act
requires facility operators, LEPCs, and SERCs to prepare contingency plans for such
releases. 
Facility managers are required to provide information to LEPCs and local
emergency responders (fire fighters, police officers, etc.) about chemicals present at
facilities and to notify those officials in the event of a sudden release.  EPCRA
requires local officials to provide information about emergency plans and chemical
hazards to the general public.  
EPCRA’s reporting and disclosure requirements are meant to facilitate planning,
but sometimes they also promote risk reduction.  For example, facility managers
concerned about community relations sometimes reduce use of particularly toxic or
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otherwise hazardous materials, sometimes to the point that they no longer have to
report, because they no longer handle reportable quantities of EPCRA chemicals.  In
other cases, the public disclosure requirement may encourage them to change
chemical processes and handling in order to reduce the risk of reportable spills.
Although EPCRA requires facility reporting and cooperation in local emergency
response planning, and it may encourage risk reduction, it stops short of requiring
facilities to assess or reduce risks of chemical releases.59  Instead, the Act directed the
EPA to study the problem and to identify any gaps in federal regulation. 
CAA Section 112(r).  In 1990, data accumulated by EPA on chemical
accidents in the United States prompted Congress again to address the threat of
catastrophic releases of chemicals that might cause immediate deaths or injuries in
communities.  It amended the Clean Air Act (CAA) to mandate EPA oversight of
risk management planning at facilities that handle more than specified threshold
quantities of hazardous substances.60  The Act defined “hazardous substances” to
include chlorine, anhydrous ammonia, methyl chloride, ethylene oxide, vinyl
chloride, methyl isocyanate, hydrogen cyanide, ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, toluene
diisocyanate, phosgene, bromine, anhydrous sulfur dioxide, sulfur trioxide, and at
least 100 other chemicals to be designated by EPA.  EPA was directed to designate
chemicals posing the greatest risks to human health or to the environment, based on
three criteria:  severity of potential acute adverse health effects, the likelihood of
accidental releases, and the potential magnitude of human exposure.  EPA
promulgated a list of 77 acutely toxic substances, 63 flammable gases and volatile
flammable liquids, and “high explosive substances” (59 Federal Register 4478, Jan.
31, 1994).  The list was amended March 13, 2000, to exclude flammable substances
when used as a fuel, or held for sale as a fuel at a retail facility.61  
The CAA Section 112(r) imposes “a general duty” on owners and operators of
facilities producing, processing, handling or storing any “extremely hazardous
substance” to detect and prevent or minimize accidental releases and to provide
prompt emergency response to a release in order to protect human health and the
environment.  The act requires owners and operators of covered facilities to prepare
Risk Management Plans (RMPs) that summarize the potential threat of sudden, large
releases of certain chemicals, including the results of off-site consequence analysis
(OCA) for a worst-case chemical accident, and facilities’ plans to prevent releases
and mitigate any damage.  Plans were to be submitted to EPA and made “available
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to the public” by June 21, 1999.  EPA is required to review RMPs regularly, and if
necessary, require revisions.  EPA has delegated this responsibility to some states and
localities.62 (All states have authority to review RMPs at facilities that are major
sources of air pollution, which are  required to obtain permits under Title V of the
Clean Air Act.)
In October 1996, the Accident Prevention Subcommittee of the Clean Air Act
Advisory Committee to EPA created the Electronic Submission Workgroup to
consider the technical and practical issues associated with an electronic database of
risk management plans.  By spring 1997, the Workgroup unanimously agreed that
EPA should provide full, unrestricted access via the Internet to most RMP
information.  However, advisors could not reach consensus regarding access to OCA
data.  
There were concerns that in facilitating electronic access to the general U.S.
public through the Internet, EPA also would be facilitating access to these data
internationally, which might permit misuse by terrorists.63  Several members of the
Accident Prevention Subcommittee recommended EPA undertake a security study
to determine how much risk might increase as a result of putting OCA data on the
Internet.  Aegis Research Corporation, ICF Incorporated, and Science Applications
International Corporation conducted the security study for EPA.  The Agency
concluded from the study that— 
 ... the risk (although still very small) was slightly more than two times higher
with unrestricted availability of the RMP with OCA data on the Internet.  This
increase reflects several factors, including the nature of the OCA data elements
and the enhanced accessibility of data on the Internet to an international
audience.  Taken together, the primary utility of the unrestricted RMP and OCA
data to a terrorist emerges from the capability to scan across the entire country
for the “best” targets.64
 In December 1997, EPA began discussions with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and other federal agencies about the electronic RMP distribution
plan.  National security concerns centered on the OCA data and their potential utility
to terrorists.   An interagency agreement was reached in late October 1998 that OCA
data would not be included in RMP information placed on the Internet.  Instead, EPA
would make “appropriate” OCA data available in some form on request, but access
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would be restricted and not anonymous.65 The possibility that OCA data could have
been distributed via the Internet remained, however, because it could have been
obtained and distributed by any citizen under the Freedom of Information Act,
according to the EPA Legal Counsel.  
To address the security concerns raised by the Section 112(r) requirements, the
Clinton Administration submitted draft legislation to Congress May 7, 1999.
Congress enacted an amended version of the legislation as an amendment to S. 880,
the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act
(Public Law 106-40). The new law amended Section 112 of the CAA to exempt
OCA data from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, and limited public
availability until EPA and DOJ issued regulations in August, 2000.   
The final RMP regulation on data access was published August 4, 2000.66  It
allows public access to paper copies of sensitive OCA information through federal
reading rooms, approximately one per state, and provides Internet access to the OCA
data elements that pose the least serious criminal risk.  State and local agencies are
encouraged to provide the public with read-only access to OCA information on local
facilities.  At the federal reading rooms, members of the public may read OCA
information for up to 10 facilities per calendar month and for all facilities with
potential effects in the jurisdiction  of the local emergency planning committee.  State
and local officials and other members of the public may share OCA information as
long as the data are not conveyed in the format of sensitive portions of the RMP or
any electronic database developed by EPA from those sections.67  A Clinton
Administration proposal to implement the final rule (66 Federal Register 4021, Jan.
17, 2001) would have allowed people to view plans of facilities outside their local
area and enhanced access for “qualified researchers.”   The draft plan was rescinded
by the Bush Administration (66 Federal Register 15254, Mar. 16, 2001).  
The 1999 Act also directed the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to report
to Congress within 3 years (i.e., before August 2002) on “the adequacy of chemical
information required to be submitted to local emergency response personnel to help
them respond to chemical incidents, the adequacy of the delivery of that information,
and the level of compliance with the requirement to submit the information.”68  That
report was released July 31, 2002.  GAO concluded that EPA officials believe
industries generally are complying with reporting requirements.  GAO’s conclusions
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about the adequacy of information and its delivery were tentative and could not be
generalized to the universe of LEPCs.  
DOJ also was directed to report to Congress within 3 years on the extent to
which RMP regulations led to actions “that are effective in detecting, preventing, and
minimizing the consequences of releases of regulated substances that may be caused
by criminal activity,” the vulnerability of facilities to criminal and terrorist activity,
“current industry practices regarding site security,” and security of transportation of
substances listed under CAA Section 112(r).”69  The law directed DOJ to consult
with state, local and federal agencies, affected industry, and the public in preparing
the report, and to submit any recommendations to Congress.   An interim report was
due within one year of enactment (i.e., by August 2000).  DOJ missed the interim
report deadline and expects to miss the final deadline as well.  The Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) filed a lawsuit against DOJ March 11, 2002, asserting that
DOJ unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed the report’s submission to
Congress.70  The interim report was released to Congress May 30, 2002, but withheld
from the public.  On June 3, 2002, DOJ filed a motion to dismiss the NRDC lawsuit.
The NRDC moved to dismiss its lawsuit on July 1, 2002.   A General Accounting
Office (GAO) study released October 10, 2002, concluded that DOJ failed to
complete the mandated study, and that the Department had the funds to do so,
although it had no specific appropriation.  "Generally, when Congress imposes a new
requirement on an agency but does not appropriate funds specifically to implement
it, the agency must use existing appropriations to fund the requirement."71
After September 11, 2001
Administrative Initiatives.   The events of September 11, 2001, bolstered the
view that access to information about facilities should be restricted if it might make
them more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  This led EPA to limit Internet access to
“sensitive” data. 
Early in October 2001, EPA removed from the Internet general information
from risk management plans – for example, about the physical state and
concentrations of chemicals at facilities and the duration of a possible chemical
release – which previously had been considered acceptable for Internet posting.  EPA
reportedly found no other information that should be removed from the Internet
during the next few months, but officials remained concerned about posted
information on facility locations that might be of use to criminals and terrorists.72  On
March 14, 2002, EPA restricted access to Envirofacts, a link to several EPA
databases that allowed the user to access facility-specific information about chemical
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releases, compliance with environmental laws, and other issues.  The next week, the
White House sent a memorandum to all federal agencies, ordering them to further
review and protect information that might be used to threaten national security or
public safety.  On May 6, 2002, President Bush signed an administrative order
granting the EPA Administrator the authority to classify as “secret” information that
might pose a national security risk.73
On the other hand, the attacks of September 11 led to increased communication
among government officials at all levels, as well as facility owners and operators.
For example, EPA advised pesticide companies and applicators to be especially
vigilant about physical security of chemicals and equipment.  The Agency issued a
“chemical safety alert” tailored to the security needs of the pesticide industry, based
on an earlier paper on site security of chemical plants that first was issued in February
2000.74 
A federal interagency working group chaired by the Office of Homeland
Security was convened to consider security needs at chemical facilities and to
develop procedures for assessing and reducing terrorist risks.  According to news
reports, the plan is nearly complete, but some details remain at issue.75 
   
Private Sector Initiatives.  Although trade associations for the chemical
industries have been engaged in emergency planning for many years, and began
developing guidelines for site security at least a year before September 11, 2001, the
events of that date infused on-going efforts with commitment and energy that
previously were not evident.  
The American Chemistry Council (ACC, formerly the Chemical Manufacturers
Association), the Chlorine Institute, Inc., and the Synthetic Organic Chemical
Manufacturers Association issued Site Security Guidelines for the U.S. Chemical
Industry on October 23, 2001.  The guidelines build on “Management Practice 15:
Site Security” in the Responsible Care® Employee Health and Safety Code.
Responsible Care® is the ACC’s response to general public concerns about the
manufacture and use of chemicals.  Members of the ACC are required to commit to
the principles of Responsible Care® and “to support a continuing effort to improve
the industry's responsible management of chemicals” by continually improving their
health, safety and environmental performance; listening and responding to public
concerns; assisting other companies to achieve optimum performance; and reporting
their goals and progress to the public.”76 There are 180 corporate ACC members
which operate approximately 1,000 chemical facilities, representing about 90% of
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U.S. chemical production capacity.77  The ACC guidelines for site security are
general, and must be adapted by chemical companies to meet site requirements.  
During April 2002, ACC circulated a draft of a Security Code of Management
Practices – 
to help companies achieve continuous improvement in security performance
using a risk-based approach to identify, assess and address vulnerabilities,
prevent or mitigate incidents, enhance training and response capabilities, and
maintain and improve relationships with key stakeholders.78
On June 5, 2002, the ACC Board of Directors voted to make the security code
mandatory for ACC members.  Some key requirements of the code include:  
! training and drills for employees, contractors, customers, and
suppliers;
! consideration of process changes, material substitutions, and other
inherently safer approaches to chemical production; 
! evaluation, response, and reporting of security threats; and 
! internal audits.79
ACC members are required to evaluate site security using vulnerability assessment
methodology equivalent to that developed by the Department of Energy’s Sandia
Laboratories for the Department of Justice80 or by the Center for Chemical Process
Safety (an industry-funded research center).  ACC members will begin by assessing
security, including computer security, at high-risk facilities, as well as from supplier
to manufacturer, to wholesaler, to retailer, and finally to customer.  After needed
security measures have been put into place, the ACC code requires verification by an
independent third party.  However, the security code does not require expenditures
for risk reduction; rather it recommends decisions should be based on an evaluation
of risks and costs.  
In addition to developing guidelines and a management code on site security,
ACC and other chemical trade organizations have been communicating extensively
with one another and with government officials about how to reduce the risks of
chemical terrorism.  For example, ACC and the Association of American Railroads
formed a taskforce to develop strategies to ensure the safety of communities near
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chemical and rail facilities.81  In addition, as mentioned above, the Center for
Chemical Process Safety is developing a risk-based methodology for assessing the
vulnerability of chemical facilities to terrorist attacks.  The Synthetic Organic
Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA) has developed a vulnerability
assessment methodology for smaller chemical producers.82  According to Tom Hall,
director of stewardship for CropLife America (a pesticide industry trade association),
pesticide and fertilizer distributors represented by CropLife America, the Fertilizer
Institute, and the Agricultural Retailers Association formed a working group to tailor
a vulnerability assessment methodology for rural facilities, where theft is a greater
threat than a direct attack on a facility.83  A document, Guidelines to Help Ensure a
Secure Agribusiness, was released October 24, 2002.84
Policy Options
September 11, 2001 prompted policy makers to reconsider federal policy
options regarding potential terrorist threats to chemical facilities.  A range of possible
strategies is summarized below.
Status quo.  Congress might rely on existing mechanisms in the public and
private sectors to continuously evaluate and improve site security.  Federal statutes
already mandate facility assessments of chemical hazards and planning to prevent,
mitigate, and respond to releases of hazardous chemicals.  And the events of
September 11, 2001, undoubtedly have reinvigorated implementation efforts by
federal, state, and local government officials, as well as facility operators.  Moreover,
trade associations have developed vulnerability assessment methodologies to
facilitate planning for diverse types of facilities.  
However, with the reorganization of the federal executive branch through
establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the status quo will
inevitably be shifting.  Many in Congress and in the current administration have
proposed changes in the way the federal government assesses risks, oversees security
for critical infrastructure, and protects information about vulnerability of facilities.
In addition, some have questioned whether EPA authority is sufficient to address
risks of terrorism within the context of existing laws.85  The Chairman of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce asked EPA to cite its specific authority to
require chemical plants to assess and reduce their vulnerability to terrorist or other
criminal actions.86  EPA did not respond prior to the Chairman’s deadline, but she
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announced in October 2002 that EPA would not pursue chemical security regulations
for fear of litigation from the chemical industry.87 The Committee has written to the
Director of the Office of Homeland Security indicating that it would prefer to have
vulnerability assessments for chemical facilities conducted by the new Department
of Homeland Security.88  The new chairman of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works is reported to agree with this view.89  The chemical
industry strongly prefers DHS oversight to that of EPA.  Although President Bush
designated EPA the lead agency on chemical security in the administration's broader
homeland security strategy, Administrator Whitman later endorsed the idea that DHS
would be better suited to handling that issue.90
Collect additional information.  Another option would be to delay
addressing chemical facility security until additional information is gathered on
which to base proposals.  The final DOJ assessment of chemical site security and the
impact of the current risk management planning program is due later this year,
although DOJ officials have said that release of results will be delayed.   For a
broader view of the issue, including analysis of policy options, Congress might
establish a Blue Ribbon Panel or request a study by the National Academy of
Sciences.  Studies could provide information about the risks of terrorism, the risks
of accidents, the views of public interest groups, and the effectiveness of public
disclosure to reduce risks.  Such information might assist Congress in evaluating
alternative approaches to reducing risks.  However, the benefits gained from delaying
federal decisions pending development of better risk information must be weighed
against the possibility that terrorists might strike before Congress acts. 
Improve EPA Guidance and Enforcement.  Congress also might provide
additional resources for, or exercise increased oversight over, implementation of
existing statutes.  Although neither EPCRA nor the CAA explicitly addresses
chemical releases due to criminal or terrorist acts, EPA arguably has sufficient
authority under the acts to more strongly encourage facilities to reduce their
vulnerability to terrorists.  Additional resources could facilitate EPA review of
facility risk management plans.  Through September 2001, EPA had reviewed only
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15% of submitted plans, according to a recent report by the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO).91
As previously mentioned, EPA already has provided guidance to facilities on
this subject, but many public interest groups would like EPA to go farther in
interpreting the risk management planning requirements of the CAA Section 112(r).92
For example, US PIRG argued in a 1998 report:
EPA missed opportunities to require companies to identify inherently safer
technologies, and ignored comments made by a coalition of environmental and
labor organizations calling for a requirement that companies undertake
Technology Options analyses to identify inherently safer technologies.93  
In lieu of regulations, EPA could be urged to provide technical assistance or
demonstration programs, or to develop incentives to encourage risk reduction.  
EPA has considered revisions to either the risk management planning rule or
EPA guidance under the CAA Section 112(r)(7) to require or encourage chemical
facility owners to assess their vulnerability to terrorists and correct any significant
weaknesses.  EPA officials expected new principles for risk management planning
to address both site and computer security; building  access; background checks;
inventory controls; storage safety; and other physical security measures, as well as
changes that improve  “inherent safety.”94  However, EPA has stated that its authority
to regulate chemical site security is unclear, and authority under the Clean Air Act
has been questioned by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.95  In
October, Administrator Whitman announced that EPA would not pursue chemical
security regulations under the CAA.96  Therefore, Congress might choose to clarify
EPA authority through legislation, or examine the adequacy of EPA’s
implementation of the risk management planning rule in congressional hearings.  
Reduce risk through legislation.  If Congress decides that legislation is
required to reduce the risks of terrorism targeting chemical plants, proposals might
focus on preventing terrorism in general or on reducing risks of terrorism specifically
targeting chemical plants.  A broad focus on reducing terrorism would involve
numerous issues that are beyond the scope of this report.  Interested readers are
referred to the CRS Issue Brief IB95112, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign
Policy.  A narrower focus on chemical plants might provide incentives for voluntary
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private sector initiatives or new regulatory authorities to reduce risks.  Stakeholder
views regarding the relative merits of voluntary versus mandatory approaches are
discussed in the next major section of this report, Policy Issues, in the subsection on
Responsibility and Accountability.  The remainder of the present discussion analyzes
selected strategies and tactics for reducing risks that may be incorporated into
legislation.  
Physical Security Enhancement.  Perhaps the most common approach to
improving site security is to “harden” defenses so that sites would be less vulnerable
to terrorists.97  According to the recently released DOJ vulnerability assessment
methodology, an effective protection system effectively serves three functions:
detection (discovery or sensing of adversary action), delay (impediment to adversary
progress), and response by security personnel to ensure that a threat is neutralized.98
Examples of hardening tactics include increasing security patrols, strengthening
fences, installing better locks on doors, relocating sensitive chemical processes
within the facility, installing intruder detection systems and alarms, and performing
background checks on employees.  Congress has adopted such tactics in other
contexts.  For example, the USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107-56) requires
background checks as a condition for obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle
transporting in commerce a hazardous material.  
A key advantage of hardening tactics is their variety and adaptability to a range
of security needs.  Other advantages include the ability to deepen defenses by adding
layers of protection and, in many cases, relatively low costs.  A potential weakness
of this strategy is that even the most effective security measures might be disabled
or overwhelmed by a determined, skilled terrorist organization.  For example, guards
may be bribed or killed, passwords discovered, alarms short-circuited, or computers
hacked.  The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks demonstrate the vulnerability
of any site to a novel and vigorous attack.
      
Technology Assessment and Inherently Safer Options.  An alternative
strategy for reducing risk is advocated by environmental groups.  It would reduce the
hazardous characteristics of the facility, for example, by reducing production,
processing, storage, and use of dangerous chemicals, or changing the characteristics
of chemicals to make them less dangerous (e.g., by reducing volatility).  Such tactics
aim to improve the “inherent safety” of a site, and are preferred by advocates to
target- hardening tactics, which they often refer to as “add-on safety systems.”99
According to this view, “‘Inherent Safety’ activities reduce or eliminate the
possibility of an accident occurring through the fundamental redesign of production
systems or products, reductions in chemical inventories, or substitution for hazardous
chemicals at the facility.”100  Currently, there is no U.S. legislation that explicitly
promotes use of safer technologies by the chemical industry.  
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Two potential advantages of this approach are that consequences of terrorism
may be reduced even if a terrorist succeeds in his mission, and that risks associated
with accidental releases of chemicals also are likely to be reduced.  In addition,
efforts to promote inherent safety of production could fill gaps in current laws, which
address risks associated with specified chemicals and industries.  According to the
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, many reactive chemicals
responsible for industrial accidents are not covered by the CAA Section 112.101  
Many facility operators have applied this approach in recent years.  For example,
a utility in Ohio chose to employ a urea-based pollution control system instead of
another system which would have required storage of large quantities of ammonia.102
Shortly after September 11, the Blue Plains wastewater treatment facility outside of
Washington D.C. stopped using chlorine in favor of the less volatile sodium
hypochlorite bleach.103  Other water and wastewater treatment plants are making
similar changes in chemical usage.
The key disadvantages of this “safer” facility strategy are potentially higher
production and research and development costs, delays in achieving security while
new processes are put into place, and, at least in some cases, lack of feasibility.
However, advocates argue that use of safer technologies may reduce production costs
by reducing regulatory burdens, insurance premiums, transportation costs, and waste
disposal costs.  Another potential disadvantage of the strategy is that some “safer”
tactics may simply spread a risk around, shift the risk to other locations or
populations, or substitute one risk for another.  For example, in replacing an acutely
toxic chemical (that produces relatively severe health effects after a short exposure)
with a less acutely toxic chemical, one might increase chronic risks (due to low-level,
long-term exposures) or environmental risks (e.g., due to the chemical’s persistence).
Deterrence.  A third approach to reducing risks aims to reduce theft, rather
than direct attacks, by making dangerous chemicals in use at a facility less attractive
to criminals, for example, by introducing a color or other property that facilitates
detection and tracking by authorities (so-called “taggants”), or by creating and storing
antidotes to toxic effects.104  A disadvantage of this approach is that taggants act as
contaminants, and therefore may impede chemical processes.  For this reason,
taggants typically are useful only in end products, not in intermediate (i.e., process)
chemicals.  Generally, such deterrents appear to be in the development stage and are
not available for immediate application.  
Restricted Access to Information.  Restricting terrorists’ access to
information about vulnerability and location of chemical facilities also might reduce
the risk of terrorism.  This approach was taken by the 106th Congress when it enacted
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amendments to the CAA Section 112(r) to prevent Internet posting of risk
management plans and worst-case scenarios for accidents.  Internet access to
information is a particular concern, because it permits anonymous inquiries about
sensitive U.S. facilities from remote locations.  
A key advantage of restricting access to sensitive information is that it is an
inexpensive method of reducing risk.  However, some argue that information
restriction is contrary to American values, reduces public oversight of chemical
facilities and consequently facility operators’ incentives to reduce risk, and is not
likely to prevent determined terrorist groups from obtaining needed information.105
The general issue of public access to facility-specific information is discussed
under Key Issues, in the section on Public Disclosure.
Key Issues
Policy makers choosing among policy options for reducing terrorist risks
associated with chemical plants are faced with at least three fundamentally political
issues: the effect of public disclosure; the relative importance of diverse risks (and
associated costs and benefits of risk reduction), and who should be responsible (and
held accountable) for achieving results.  
Public Disclosure.  Public disclosure of information about chemical hazards
and risk management plans at industrial facilities is controversial.106  Professional and
trade groups representing the chemical industry oppose the release of information
regarding the vulnerability of facilities to terrorism and the potential off-site
consequences (OCA) to public health and the environment.  They argue that terrorists
might use the information to target facilities that are most vulnerable or located near
large population centers.  Congress responded to this view when it enacted
amendments to the CAA Section 112(r) in 1999.  The chemical industry and some
policy analysts support legislation that would further restrict public disclosure of such
information and exempt it from requirements of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).  (See Legislation in the 108th Congress, below.)107 
Other groups, including environmental and right-to-know advocates, oppose
restrictions on public disclosure.  They argue that communities have a right to be
informed about hazards to which they might be exposed, and free access to
information is important to ensure public accountability of facility managers.
Opponents of limiting public information also point out that citizens need
information to assess facility compliance with environmental laws, and if necessary,
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to petition EPA or the courts for enforcement.108  Unsafe practices and inadequate
risk management plans, in particular, should be publicized, they contend, so that
communities may exert political or social pressure on plant managers to improve the
inherent safety of their facilities.  Moreover, these groups want access to information
about similar facilities handling comparable chemicals across the United States, so
that plans and accident rates can be compared and analyzed to determine the
effectiveness of various safety measures.  Informed citizens can work with local plant
managers to reduce the risk of accidents, they argue.  This view was adopted by
Congress in the 1990 amendments to the CAA Section 112(r).109  
A more recent argument in favor of public disclosure has been advanced by
investment groups, who argue, “Investors need to know about potential liabilities of
companies in which they invest.”110  Information about risks related to environmental
issues frequently is not reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission, even
though it requires disclosure of trends and uncertainties that are reasonably likely to
have an impact on companies’ profits.111
With respect to the possibility that information may be used by terrorists, right-
to-know advocates claim that public disclosure of chemical hazards motivates facility
operators to reduce chemical hazards, thereby reducing the likelihood and severity
of harm from terrorist attacks, as well as the risk of chemical accidents.
The net effect on risk to public health and the environment of public disclosure,
therefore, appears to depend on the relative risks of releases due to accidents, versus
those due to terrorism, and on the extent to which those risks are reduced or enhanced
by publication of risk management plans and similar information.  However, data are
not available to calculate risks, relative risks, or risk reduction/enhancement
potential.  
A related issue is the extent to which federal laws regarding public disclosure
should preempt state and local disclosure laws.  Public Law 107-296, establishing
DHS, prohibits release under the authority of state and local disclosure laws of
“information (including the identity of the submitting person or entity) that is
voluntarily submitted to a covered Federal agency for use by that agency regarding
the security of critical infrastructure and protected systems.” 
Relative Risks.  Another important issue involves the diverse and sometimes
conflicting goals implicit in discussions of chemical site security enhancement; there
is general agreement that risks should be reduced, and that “the greatest risks” should
be addressed first, but little discussion of which risks are “greatest” and should be
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targeted and at what cost.  For example, should we focus on lowering death rates or
rates of sickness and disability?  On preventive measures or emergency response and
recovery services?  Should we allocate resources to prevent worst-case scenarios, or
everyday risks that add up over time?  Are risks due to chemical terrorism worse than
risks of equal or greater magnitude due to explosions or firearms?  Should we
emphasize measures to reduce terrorist risks that also may improve federal efforts to
prepare for and respond to other disasters, as the President’s National Strategy
suggests?112  To what extent are we willing to sacrifice access to information about
facilities in our neighborhoods, privacy,  or government accountability for the sake
of risk reduction?  Are we willing to shift federal resources to a new Department of
Homeland Security and away from education, environmental protection, medical
assistance, or other areas, so as to constrain government spending overall?  The
answers to such questions depend on value judgments and are likely to lead to
diverse policy approaches and decisions about particular federal initiatives to reduce
the threat of terrorism.  
For example, on the one hand, it often is argued that federal expenditures are
most efficient when they are allocated with respect to relative risks and risk reduction
opportunities.  According to this view, relatively more federal funding should be
provided to programs targeting risks that are greater and more clearly documented
(e.g., to prevent smoking or motor vehicle accidents), than for programs targeting
small, hypothetical risks (e.g., from exposure to pesticide residues on food).  Based
on this reasoning, the risks of chemical terrorism in the United States would deserve
relatively few resources, because they are hypothetical and very small.  This is
especially true for individual chemical facilities.  Such reasoning might leave some
chemical facilities vulnerable to attack.  As explained by the President of the
Louisiana Chemical Association, “Worst-case scenarios are just that: Virtually every
safety system in every process would have to fail for a worst-case scenario to actually
happen.”113  Will the federal government or plant operators find such a scenario
incredible, and thus, not worth additional security investments?  What cost is
justified for risk reduction at individual chemical facilities? 
On the other hand, some have argued that the distribution of risk is more
important than the absolute or relative magnitude of risk.  Scholars at the Brookings
Institution, for example, argue that federal resources to combat terrorism should be
devoted primarily to avoiding or mitigating potentially catastrophic terrorist acts.114
Catastrophic events, in which many people are killed or injured at once often strain
local social, political, and economic systems, as well as emergency response
resources, as was well illustrated by the attack on the World Trade Center.   Thus, the
Brookings report focuses on protecting against nuclear, chemical, or biological
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terrorism and large-scale attacks at airports, seaports, nuclear and chemical plants,
stadiums, big commercial buildings, monuments, and American icons, as opposed
to preventing numerous smaller attacks that might produce an equal number of
casualties over a longer period of time.    
 
Still others object to reliance on any form of cost-benefit accounting with
respect to public health and environmental risk management, because quantitative,
analytic tools often ignore risk factors and management options that they consider
important.115  For example, one cannot produce a reliable estimate of benefits that
might accrue from basing decisions on the so-called “precautionary principle” or
most other preventive management tools, because risks and clean-up costs never
occur, and cannot be validated or corrected.  Moreover, it can be argued that
quantitative analysis is biased against preventive measures, because the hypothetical
benefits, as well as the hypothetical risks, accrue (or not) in the future and generally
are discounted (reduced in value).  This process inevitably estimates that preventive
options will have relatively high short-term costs and relatively low and uncertain
long-term benefits.  
Responsibility and Accountability.  Deciding who should be responsible
for achieving results (or  who should be held accountable) requires consideration of
many factors, including statutory authority, resource availability, technical
competence, political feasibility, and moral or ethical constraints.   Responsibility is
multifaceted, involving financial, operational, and managerial duties, and may be
layered hierarchically.  In addition, responsibility may be shared or distributed among
several private and public entities.  For example, in the case of chemical plant safety,
responsibility probably will be divided in some manner to include owners/operators
of facilities, insurers, and some unit of government.  It is up to policy makers to
decide upon the appropriate distribution of each component. 
Generally, people agree that the federal government is responsible for
protecting citizens and the homeland, and that business owners are responsible for
not causing hazards for their employees, neighbors, and assets.  However, people
have different views about who should be held accountable for the consequences of
an act of terrorism, what level of protection from risk is acceptable, whether the
private sector is likely to achieve that level of protection without public assistance
or oversight, and who should bear the costs of achieving greater safety.  These
different views largely reflect general political philosophies (e.g., regarding the
appropriate role of government and the value of public involvement in risk
management decisions), but they also are influenced by specific knowledge of, and
attitudes toward, the chemical industry, EPA, and other governmental and non-
governmental entities.  
Some argue that the risks of terrorism for individual chemical facilities are so
small that many facility managers are unlikely to invest sufficient resources to
adequately ensure site security.  Based on this view, some argue that sufficient
reductions in terrorist risks for the nation as a whole can be assured only if chemical
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facilities are required to comply with federal standards for risk management, i.e., are
held accountable by government.  Federally mandated standards are likely to ensure
a greater level of safety, according to this view, because administrative rule-making
procedures provide for public comments, including comments by people potentially
at risk if a terrorist attacks, but who do not directly profit from neighboring facilities.
Voluntary chemical site security measures advocated by trade associations do not
suffice, it is argued, because they have no standards, no timelines, no hazard
reduction policies, no measurable hazard reduction goals, no accountability, and are
not enforceable.116 
If Congress agrees that the private sector must be held accountable, legislation
could be enacted authorizing EPA or the Department of Homeland Security to
conduct or oversee facility vulnerability studies or to set standards for facility risk
management.  The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works in the 107th Congress expressed a preference that
EPA lead such an effort,117 but the current Chairman of the same Senate committee
and the Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce prefer
leadership by the new Department.118
Others contend that chemical facility operators are willing and prepared to
reduce significant risks, for personal, professional, and business reasons.119  They
argue that well-managed businesses routinely assess, prioritize, and manage risks of
all kinds, including risks of potential exposure to hazardous chemicals due to
criminal or terrorist acts.  Business incentives to good chemical risk management
include reduced legal liability, reduced insurance costs, enhanced reputation,
improved employee relations, and reduced costs for remediation and victim
compensation.  In the United States, environmental and occupational health and
safety laws provide additional incentives to many facility operators to responsibly
manage hazardous chemicals. 
Many, including the Bush Administration, are opposed to new legislation,
which, they argue, may disrupt and delay installation of security enhancements by
individual companies.  On the other hand, if such legislation were enacted, it could
benefit businesses by shifting liability to the government and discouraging states
from adopting diverse regulatory strategies.   
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Industry representatives acknowledge that some guidance, training, and financial
assistance for threat assessment and risk management are needed, especially for
addressing risks to small businesses, but note that trade associations and industrial
research centers have been working for several years to fill such needs.  Such groups
advocate a flexible, risk-based approach to securing facilities, arguing that “most
plants are not likely terrorist targets.”120  The ACC favors “public-private
partnerships that allow industry to do as much as they can on their own with perhaps
guidance [from government].”121  Business groups argue that most regulations
inappropriately force diverse enterprises to adopt a “one-size-fits-all” strategy.  To
satisfy any public demand for assurance that risk reduction is occurring, some
industry representatives have recommended a safety certification process and are
willing to submit their facilities to independent audits.  
The Bush Administration hopes to avoid legislation to enhance security
measures at chemical facilities, according to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, Tom Ridge.122 He acknowledged that the Administration had
been considering a regulatory approach to ensure site security a few months ago, but
more recently (as of mid-July, 2002) has been leaning toward a voluntary approach.
The change “reflects an acceptance by industry of a need ... to do a better job of
securing their facilities,” Director Ridge explained.123
The Administration also would assign financial responsibility to chemical
facility owners.  According to Ridge, “[T]his is a cost [chemical companies] have to
absorb.”  For their part, some pesticide trade groups would welcome increased
government assistance in the form of funding for education.124  
Legislation in the 107th Congress
The 107th Congress did not enact legislation to reduce risks of terrorism at
facilities handling potentially dangerous chemicals.  Public Law 107-296,
establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), does not address chemical
plant security directly.  However, if facilities are part of the “critical infrastructure”
(e.g., water utilities), the law will require DHS to analyze vulnerabilities and
recommend methods of enhancing site security.  The law exempts from public
disclosure requirements (i.e., FOIA) information submitted voluntarily to DHS by
such facilities about physical and cyber security for use by that agency related to “the
security of critical infrastructure and protected systems.”  Disclosure under the
authority of state or local laws also is prohibited.  Unauthorized disclosure of “critical
CRS-31
infrastructure information” by government employees is punishable by imprisonment,
fines, and removal from office.
In the 108th Congress, legislation addressing risks of terrorism targeting
chemical facilities that handle large quantities of hazardous chemicals reportedly is
a priority of the new Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works, but he has not yet introduced a proposal.  In accord with the views of the
Bush Administration, the Chairman would like DHS to oversee chemical plant
security.  
Two bills addressing the issue,  S. 6, Title X and S. 157, have been introduced.
The bills would build on existing EPA authority to oversee chemical facilities, but
would require consultation with DHS.  Both bills are similar to S. 1602, as reported
in the 107th Congress (S.Rept. 107-342).  They would require EPA to designate
“certain combinations of chemical sources and substances of concern” as high
priority categories based on the severity of the threat posed by an unauthorized
release, proximity to population centers, and other criteria, and to require owners and
operators of facilities within high priority categories to conduct vulnerability
assessments, identify hazards, and prepare prevention, preparedness, and response
plans to eliminate or significantly lessen the potential consequences of an
unauthorized release.  Copies of vulnerability assessments and plans would be
submitted to EPA and updated periodically. 
S. 6 and S. 157 would protect vulnerability assessments and plans from public
disclosure under FOIA, but the non-disclosure provisions of these bills differ
considerably from those in P.L. 107-296.  Generally, compared to the law’s
exemption from FOIA for voluntarily submitted “critical infrastructure information,”
the Senate bills introduced to date appear to exempt a narrower range of information
from disclosure under FOIA, equivalent to exemptions allowed by FOIA itself.  In
addition, the bills would allow disclosure of information under state or local laws, if
the state or local government received the information independently of DHS.  And
they provide no civil liability immunity for those who submit information nor
criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure.  For more on issues related to
information disclosure, see CRS Report RL31547, Critical Infrastructure
Information Disclosure and Homeland Security. 
S. 6 and S. 157 direct EPA to review each assessment and plan, determine
compliance, and certify that determination.  The bills provide for early review and
certification of assessments and plans submitted before EPA issues regulations.  EPA
would be authorized to issue compliance orders 30 days after notifying a chemical
source that its assessment or plan is inadequate and offering compliance assistance,
if the plan is not revised to comply with EPA requirements.  If DHS notified a
chemical source that its plan or implementation was insufficient to address a threat
of terrorist attack, and the chemical source took inadequate action in response to that
notice, DHS would be authorized to secure necessary relief to abate the threat from
the district court in which the threat exists.
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Conclusions
The threat of terrorism in the United States challenges the existing balance
maintained in federal laws between the public’s right to know about chemical
hazards and the chemical industry’s right to protect confidential business
information.  At issue are risks to public health and safety, environmental protection,
civil rights and duties, national security, and privacy.  Some are advocating a strategy
of relative risk analysis and analysis of risk management options to reveal the best
course of action.  However, information appears to be inadequate for quantitative
evaluation of the risks of chemical releases, whether deliberate or accidental, and the
nature of terrorism makes prediction difficult.  Moreover, there is no universally
accepted level of tolerable risk, no obvious basis for a comparison of relative risks
and benefits, and no established federal mechanism for ensuring responsible
management of the risks of chemical terrorism.  
The 107th Congress did not enact legislation to reduce risks of terrorism at
facilities handling large quantities of potentially dangerous chemicals.  However, it
established a new Department of Homeland Security to analyze vulnerabilities of
“critical infrastructure” and recommend methods of enhancing site security.
Legislation in the 108th Congress (S. 6, Title X, and S. 157) would build on existing
EPA authority to oversee chemical facilities, while requiring consultation with DHS.
Both bills are similar to S. 1602, as reported in the 107th Congress (S.Rept. 107-342).
They would require EPA to designate “certain combinations of chemical sources and
substances of concern” as high priority categories and to require owners and
operators of facilities within those categories to conduct vulnerability assessments,
identify hazards, and prepare and implement prevention, preparedness, and response
plans.  These bills are opposed by the Bush Administration which would prefer to
give DHS primary authority to regulate chemical facilities. 
